DOI: 23 JULY 2017


What are the current Primary and Secondary issues faced by BKT Police?

  • Primary:
    • Voshod forces establish themselves as a persistent terror threat to Berkovetus and its allies by gaining excessive legitimacy.
  • Secondary:
    • Voshod Osvobozhdeniye Berkovitsa evolve into a highly capable terror threat, aiding Voshod legitimacy.
    • The Police Force is viewed as inept with the handling of terror threats, resulting in tasks being escalated to military control.
    • Loss of diplomacy within the international region due to terror threats.
    • Illicit arms and drug trade continues throughout the region.

What’s happened so far?

OPERATION SHADOW (PHANTOM) – Not much was known about VOB prior to Operation Shade. Varcolac forces conducted intelligence gathering patrols to find out more about the group. This led Varcolac operators to find the location of several High Value Targets. The HVTs were extracted and safely returned to domestic intelligence for interrogation – resulting in actionable intelligence being provided on the location of captured high profile political figure, Vladislav Sokolov.

OPERATION SHADOW (SHADE) – Vladislav Sokolov was successfully rescued from his captors by Varcolac Police. The remaining political figures were unable to be saved, and are presumed dead as no media coverage of their whereabouts has emerged since the raid. Varcolac Police suffered numerous loss to life during the raid conducted early morning on 16 July 2017, resulting in a loss of faith from the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

OPERATION SHADOW (GHOUL) – Abram Morozov, a suspected Mafia drug dealer, turned out to be a high profile arms dealer who was/is funnelling weapons and ammunition into Berkovetus in favour of VOB and potentially other Voshod groups. Operation Ghoul also provided critical intelligence to suggest Voshod groups may be more capable than initially anticipated. Morozov, who was the primary target for the 19 July 2017 raid, managed to evade Varcolac forces.

What’s the present situation?

After Varcolac’s lastest raid against the VOB, domestic intelligence provided a SIGINT report showing significant reduction in intra-group communications. This reduction in comms may indicate that the group is in the process of going into hiding – presumably in anticipation of force escalation by the Berkovetian government.

The VOB going dark has caused major issues in the collection of actionable intelligence. This greatly affects the strategic objectives of:

  • gathering intelligence to enable preemptive strikes on the VOB before they grow into an advanced capability group, and
  • simulatenously acting as a reaction force to acute emergency terrorist threat

Abram Morozov managed to escape Varcolac capture. Domestic intelligence provided no reason to consider Morozov out of the picture, and is therefore believed to still be in play. Although multiple VOB assets have been either siezed or demolished, it seems the group has multiple financing pathways in play.

There is still no known intelligence on the figure known as Peklenc. However, domestic intelligence believe Peklenc may be the key to explaining the VOB’s rapidly increasing and sustaining capability. In addition, BSB beleive he is either senior VOB leadership or a mid-level Berkovetus People’s Militia (BPM) finance figure coordinating BPM-VOB supply lines.

Before VOB went dark, domestic intelligence found trends showing a potential use of IEDs. The BSB suspect they may be exploring their explosive capabilities for anticipated future use.

What are we going to do about it?

VOB going dark has resulted in a shift of strategic focus – primarily gathering intelligence. Our partnering intelligence agencies have provided reports on the need for all forms of intelligence to be collected so that a clearer holistic picture of Voshod capabilities can be produced. Varcolac are to conduct intelligence gathering operations by raiding known source locations and bagging anything that may be of use.

Moving forward, intelligence divisions will then use the collected intel to try and find out where VOB are being funded from, and how best to neutralise or hamstring their operations.

If sufficient, accurate intelligence is gathered, and a holistic understanding of VOB operations is formulated, domestic intelligence will provide a report to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and a decision will be made on whether the anti-Voshod operations are continued to be perused by the Police Force, or whether an escalation to military intervention is required.




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